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1 Introduction 
Tradable permits (tradable quota) have become an important tool in managing 
externalities. Cost efficiency has been seen as the main advantage of these types of policy 
measures: a predefined environmental target can be reached at lowest costs (Baumol and 
Oates, 1971). Assuming perfect market conditions  (i.e. in absence of transaction costs), 
those permits will be used by those who attribute it the highest value (Tietenberg, 2003) 
and this regardless the initial allocation of the permits (Montgomery, 1972).Tradable 
permits are useful when the concerned emissions have no local impact on environment or 
population (Lejano and Hirose, 2005) such as greenhouse gases and NOx. In such cases it 
doesn’t matter where the pollutants are emitted because only the aggregated 
concentration affects the environment. However, when emissions have an immediate or 
almost immediate effect on the local environment, emissions trading does not guarantee 
that initial policy goals are reached for each local receptor. Due to trading of the 
emissions, hotspots of emissions can occur (Lejano and Hirose, 2005), affecting the local 
population and environment. Examples are toxins (lead,  SO2,…) and noise. 
Therefore, Stavins (1995) argues that an ambient or concentration permit trading system 
(CPT) is theoretically to be preferred to regular emission permit trading (EPT). A 
concentration permit is then defined as a permission to deposit a quantity of pollutants at 
a specific receptor (Ermoliev et al., 2000). Theoretically, the market will give a cost 
efficient outcome (Montgomery, 1972) but some authors believe that in practice such 
systems generate high transaction costs and that cost-effectiveness will not be reached 
(Tietenberg, 1995). This complexity can be seen as a major reason why, based on 
literature knowledge, no policies based on CPT have been developed so far. On the other 
hand, some simulations of well-described problems may show the potential of CPTs and 
facilitate the analyses of CPT effects. An example of such a well-described problem is 
the manure problem and manure policy interventions. Basically, the manure policies are 
attempts to solve problems of surplus production at certain locations by spreading the 
impact over a larger area while safeguarding the carrying capacity of the environment at 
each location. The manure problem has been extensively described (Aillery et al., 2009; 
Aubry et al., 2006; Berentsen, 2003; Berentsen and Tiessink, 2003; Courdier et al., 2002; 
Feinerman et al., 2004; Feinerman and Komen, 2005; Helming and Reinhard, 2009; 
Huhtala and Marklund, 2008; Karaczun, 2005; Keplinger and Hauck, 2006; Lauwers, 
1993; Lauwers et al., 1998; Le Goffe, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Oenema et al., 2007; Piot-
Lepetit and Vermersch, 1998; Sims et al., 2002; Staalduinen et al., 2002; Wossink, 2003; 
Wossink and Gardebroeck, 2006), making it a good case to enrich our knowledge on CPT 
based on a spatial modeling system. 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to compare the EPT system with a CPT system for 
the Flemish manure policy case. For this case both the private costs for farmers as well as 
the environmental impact of both the EPT and the CPT are compared. To do so the paper 
applies a multi actor spatial programming model (earlier described by Van der Straeten et 
al. (2009a)) to simulate a situation in which either a CPT system or EPT system is used. 
The paper highlights the specific characteristics of the market of tradable concentration 
rights and how they can be analysed.  
Second objective is to describe and analyse the socio-economic adjustment of a CPT 
system based on the example of the processing obligation as an abatement strategy for the 
larger firms in the Flemish manure policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. The paper starts with describing the possibility of 
using the manure-policy case, and in particular the Flemish manure policy as an example 
of a CPT system. This section also gives a description of the processing obligation as a 
case for social adjustment of the CPT policy. Section 3 describes the analytical model 
used for analysing the CPT and EPT systems followed by an elaboration of the spatial 
aspects of permit prices and how the costs and benefits from trade in permits can be 
calculated. The result section starts with a comparison between EPT and CPT systems 
followed by the socio-economic analysis of the obligatory emission processing. Section 5 
discusses the results and concludes. 
2 The  Flemish Manure Policy as a CPT Case  
2.1. Fertilization limits as tradable concentration permits 
Ambient or concentration permit trading systems are terms which are used in literature 
for the same thing. In the remainder of the paper we will use the term concentration 
permit trading  (CPT).  
Despite the theoretical advantages (Ng and Eheart, 2005), until now CPT systems have 
not been widely used. Especially for air pollution the system can offer great advantages 
compared to EPT as it can prevent concentration of pollution (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 
1987). As an alternative, problems in which spatial issues of the resource use or emission 
do matter are often tackled by incorporating spatial limitations in trading of the permits 
(Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987; Tietenberg, 2003). The RECLAIM program in the U.S., 
for example, makes a distinction between two areas (coastal and inland area). Because of 
the predominant wind going from the coast to the inland, EPTs could only be transferred 
within the same area or from the coastal to the inland area. EPT transfers from the inland 
area to the coastal were prohibited (Harrison, 2003).  Similar trade rules were introduced 
in the Dutch Nutrient Quota System. Phosphate production was steered by means of 
animal based manure production rights. Each farm was allowed to produce 125 kg P2O5 
per hectare of land. Farmers producing more manure in terms of phosphate need 
additional manure production rights. These rights are tradable between farmers. Also here 
distinction is made between two regions: a manure surplus (average phosphate 
production is higher than 125 kg per hectare) and a manure deficit (with phosphate 
production below 125 kg/ha) region. Trade of rights is allowed within each region and 
from the surplus region to the deficit region (Wossink, 2003). 
The Dutch Nutrient Quota System was introduced to control the externalities of the 
intensive livestock production. In Flanders, a region within Belgium and adjacent to the 
Netherlands, the same type of problem of animal concentration and production and 
emission of animal manure is found. The Flemish manure policy is, together with the 
Dutch manure policy, probably the most elaborated policy in controlling the use and 
production of nutrients originating from agricultural sources. 
The Flemish manure policy limits the amount of nutrients (N and P2O5) of animal manure 
emission with fertilization standards. Van der Straeten et al. (Van der Straeten et al., 
2009a) describe these standards of organic nitrogen use as Nutrient Allocation Rights 
(NARs). One NAR gives the farmer the right to emit one kg of organic nitrogen. NARs 
are allocated to individual firms based on land use; as an example per hectare of arable 
cropland each farm receives 170 NARs for organic nitrogen. The emitted nutrients must 
be used on that specific hectare of land, which makes NARs an example of concentration 
standards. Concentration standards limit the emission per unit of output, per unit of 
effluent or per receptor (Bruneau, 2005; Ermoliev et al., 2000). NARs have also been 
categorized as tradable emission rights (Lauwers et al., 2003b) because the policy allows 
transactions of NARs between farmers. In contrast to other examples of emission permits, 
the right to emit is locally fixed and the emission right can be traded (Buysse et al., 
2008). Therefore, the NARs are close to and can be described as an example of a CPT 
system. 
2.2. Social adjustments 
The main theoretical advantage of tradable permits, this is efficiency increase, is at the 
same time also a considerable social disadvantage. Large differences in efficiency 
between firms may indeed lead to concentration of permits on the most efficient firms 
(Tietenberg, 2003). This is e.g, very often the case with ITQs (individual transferable 
quotas) in fisheries where concentration of permits in larger vessels is very often 
observed (Branch, 2009) with as a result negative social effects because of the exit of 
many small fishermen (Palsson, 1998). Different social measures can be imposed to 
protect small firms or less competitive communities in such cases (Tietenberg, 2003), as 
e.g. in Alaskan fisheries where quota were allocated to local communities to counteract 
their competitive disadvantage (Ginter, 1995). The European dairy policy is also based on 
a system of tradable permits (Van der Straeten et al., 2009b). Spatial concentration of 
permits in highly efficient regions is avoided by imposing transfer limitations between 
countries (Alvarez et al., 2006). Some member states even imposed trade limitations 
within their country (as e.g. Belgium: Jespers et al. (2006)). 
Within the Flemish system of NARs, social adjustment measures have been taken as 
well. Because of the highly intensive livestock production is concentrated in only some 
regions in Flanders, the introduction of NARs would lead to a large competition for free 
NARs resulting in high market prices. The Flemish farms are mostly rather small family 
farms (Calus et al., 2008) with only a small number of larger farms specialized in 
intensive animal production. The policy maker wanted to mitigate the economic impact 
of the environmental policy on small family farms. Therefore, the regulation intervenes in 
the market for NARs by imposing that larger farms in regions with concentrated animal 
production have to use emission abatement strategies rather than buying additional NARs 
(Lauwers et al., 2003a) (see also further).  
2.3. Making the concept operational 
The Flemish manure policy prescribes how individual firms have to deal with their 
emission (manure). The produced emission per firm is calculated based on the number of 
animals per animal type, feeding technique and housing type. All produced manure must 
either be emitted within the available concentration rights (NARs) or the firm has to 
choose for emission abatement, which is manure processing. The initial allocation of the 
concentration rights is based on land use but the right to emit an amount of manure can 
be traded among firms. Therefore, the firms have three allocation choices. First, they can 
use their produced emission (manure) within their own concentration rights. Second, the 
firms can transport their emissions to other firms with unused concentration rights, which 
means permit trading. Third, the firm has the option to engage in emission processing. As 
a result, the Flemish manure policy has created a demand and supply of concentration 
rights (Van der Straeten et al., 2009a).  
Manure processing or treatment is defined as a comprehensive term for all technologies 
which remove or recover nutrients out of manure (Flotats et al., 2008). The end products 
can be used on farmland, home and public gardens etc (Melse and Timmerman, 2008). 
The decision to opt for manure processing as a result of too high prices for concentration 
rights is in this paper referred to as market driven processing. Market driven processing 
happens when the purchase of NARs and the joint manure transport costs are higher than 
the costs for manure processing. Next to the market driven manure processing, the 
Flemish manure policy has also created legal obligatory processing imposed on a small 
number of larger firms
1
. By imposing obligatory manure processing, the government 
interferes in the NAR market by removing a share of the demand for NARs which should 
reduce the price of NARs.  
Especially in regions with a very high manure production, danger existed that small 
family livestock farms would not be able to compete for free rights. The initial goal of the 
policy was to protect these farms against a significant raise in costs and pass on the costs 
to the more industrial farms. In this paper, we will examine the effectiveness and 
efficiency of this social policy adjustment. 
3 Method 
3.1 The NAR market model 
Geographically, the concentration rights (NARs) are evenly spread, but the production 
leading to emissions is regionally concentrated. This spatial difference between demand 
and supply of NARs can be simulated by a spatial price equilibrium model (SPE). The 
SPE model computes the supply prices, demand prices and emission trade flows 
satisfying the equilibrium condition. This condition states that, when trade between two 
regions occurs, the demand price of a NAR equals the supply price plus the transport 
cost. Trade doesn’t occur when demand price is lower than supply price plus transport 
costs. Transport costs of the emission or reallocation of the sources of emission are the 
main characteristic that distinguishes concentration rights from traditional emission 
rights. Transportation is captured in the SPE model. The demand and supply for NARs of 
each agent is simulated by a mathematical programming model that assumes cost 
minimizing behaviour of the allocation of the emission.  
                                                 
1
 Each firm with a production of more emissions than an equivalent of 10,000 kg 
phosphate and each firm in a municipality with a production of 100 P2O5/ha and a 
production of more than 7,500 kg phosphate, is obliged to process a given share of the 
farm manure surplus. This share depends on the total phosphate production at the farm: 
30% at farms with a phosphate production between 7,500 and 10,000 kg per year, 50% at 
farms with a production between 10,000 and 12,500, 75% at farms with a production 
between 12,500 and 15,000 and 90% for farms with a phosphate production of more than 
15,000 kg. 
 
The combination of mathematical programming models for each agent and the SPE 
model creates an overall Mathematical Programming Multi-Agent Simulation model 
(MP-MAS), which is used in this paper and more in detail described in Van der Straeten 
et al. (2009a). The data needed for the model contain information of each individual firm 
about its location, production and NARs. Based on this information, a firm-specific 
supply or demand of NARs is calculated (Van der Straeten et al., 2009a). The MP-MAS 
allocation model is able to simulate the different costs related to each allocation option at 
firm level and is able to simulate endogenously market prices of the NARs. The model 
distinguishes between the disposal costs, the transport and the treatment cost and the 
concentration right costs, i.e. the costs for obtaining NARs from other firms. The 
transport, disposal and treatment costs are extra costs at sector level while the 
concentration right costs are the result of a redistribution within the sector.  
We start from the equation in Stavins (Stavins, 1995) where the quantity of traded 
permits (ti) by farmer i is defined as: 
                       (1) 
with ui the unconstrained emission, ri the emission reduction or abatement and q0i the 
initial allocated permits. Translated to our manure case, this equation becomes: 
                         (2)  
where TPi is the traded permits by farmer i, NPi the nitrogen production per farmer, NTi 
the volume of treated (processed) nitrogen and NAR0i the initial NAR allocation per 
farmer. To explicit the manure problem as an analogue of the CPT issue, the 
correspondence of terms is given in table I. 
 
Table I: correspondence of terms between CPT – manure problem analogue 
CPT - system  Manure problem 
description symbol  description symbol 
Unconstrained emission U  Nitrogen production NP 
Emission reduction / 
abatement 
R  Nitrogen treatment NT 
Initial allocated permits Q0  Initial allocated NARs NAR0 
Traded permits T  Traded permits TP 
Constrained emission cost
(1)
   Disposal cost Cd 
(1) mostly the cost to emit a pollutant is zero. For example there is no cost to emit CO2 in the air 
Each farmer tries to minimize his total costs (TC): 
                                                        
 (3) 
                                (4) 
in which Ct is the treatment costs, Cd the disposal costs, PNAR the price per traded NAR 
and T(TPi) the transport costs which are function of the distance of farmer i to the NAR-
location (di), the transport cost per unit of distance (Ctrans) and the quantity of obtained 
NARs between both farms (tri). 
When the production exceeds the available permits, the farmer has the choice to buy 
additional permits or to abate the surplus (nitrogen treatment, NT). The optimal level of 
treatment is where total costs are minimized: 
   
          
    
          (5) 
Substituting equation (2) into equation (3) gives: 
                             (6) 
where the price the farmer wants to pay (PNAR) equals the difference between the 
treatment cost and the disposal cost minus the transport costs. The higher the transport 
costs, the lower the price the farmer wants to pay for the permit. 
However, trade in NARs generates benefits for the supplier of NARs. Therefore the 
revenues generated from trade must be taken into account as well, resulting in the net 
costs of farmer i (NCi).  
For a demander of NARs, which generates no profits from sale, the net costs are equal to 
the total costs (equation 7): 
                  (7) 
with TCi implying costs for purchased NARs 
For a supplier of NARs, the revenues from trade are: 
                               (8) 
 Net costs, as it will be modelled for each farm i will then be modelled as revenues to be 
subtracted from the total costs to arrive at the net costs (equation 9):    
                                  (9) 
with NAR_soldi the NARs sold on the NAR market.  
At sector level, the benefits equal the cost of trading NARs, so that the sum of the net 
costs at sector level equals the total amount of money going out the sector. 
The calculation of the price of the NARs and the resulting redistribution over location 
and among farmers is explained in next subsection. 
3.2 Price of NARs 
Under perfect market conditions, and EPT assumptions, a uniform market price can be 
found (Baumol and Oates, 1971). In CPT, however, the unequal distribution of emissions 
and NARs and the distance between suppliers and demanders becomes important in 
price-settings. Stavins (1994, 1995) imputes transport costs the same characteristics as 
other transaction costs because of the similar influence on the market equilibrium. In the 
case of the NAR market, the purchaser of rights bears the transportation costs. This 
results in a downward shift of the demand curve (Figure 1). Similar to transaction costs 
(Stavins, 1995), transportation costs lead to a difference in the price a seller of rights 
receives (PS) and the price paid by the purchaser (PD). The traded volume decreases from 
Qm to QT. However, the shift of the demand curve (figure 1) is not the same for the whole 
range of exchanged NARs because the cost reallocation of emission varies. Reallocation 
of emission can be achieved by reallocating the production or by transporting the 
emission. In the case of manure, the transport of the emission is the cheapest and easiest 
and, therefore, in this paper the reallocation costs are transport costs. The case of manure 
is, however, complicated by the heterogeneous manure transport cost, which depends on 
the quantity of emitted nitrogen.  
 
 
The shift in the demand curve depends also depends on the location of the market for 
NARs. NARs located far from the emission source bear higher transport costs. The 
resulting demand curve shifts more to the left and the observed price of the NARs is 
lower at a lower traded volume. In regions with high emission concentration, competition 
for concentration rights is high. Firms in regions with highly concentrated sources of 
emission have to choose to buy expensive local NARs or reallocate their emission to a 
region with lower prices for the rights but they have to bear the reallocation costs.  This 
specific characteristic of the NARs results in spatial differences in market prices, which 
has also been shown for the manure emission rights (Van der Straeten and Buysse, 2009; 
Van der Straeten et al., 2009a). 
3.3 Specification of costs and benefits from trade of NARs 
The price of the NARs (PNAR) generates a reallocation of revenues within a sector if the 
actual use is different from the initial allocation, i.e. when          . In our case of 
manure emission rights in Flanders, the distribution of the rights is based on land use 
while the emission is based on animal production. There is a strong correlation between 
land use and animal production for cattle farms. However, the correlation is much smaller 
for specialist animal production and specialist arable production. The former have a 
significant shortage of NARs while the latter have a significant surplus.  
The second objective of the paper is to assess shifts in revenue among agents caused by 
socially inspired policy interventions in the trade of NARs and needs an in-detail 
description of the cost and benefits from trade of NARs. The concentration emission from 
manure can be expressed homogeneously as kg N/ha. The source of the emission, 
manure, on the other hand is rather heterogeneous. Each animal type, as a combination of 
species, age and feeding system, produces manure with own characteristics (e.g. nutrient 
content and dry matter content). The model in the current paper considers four different 
manure types with each a fixed nutrient content.  
All four types have a specific nitrogen content resulting in different transport cost per kg 
of nitrogen. This results in a discontinuous demand curve for NARs. A firm first 
transports the cheapest type of manure, resulting in a small downwards shift of the curve, 
Figure 1: graphical representation of the market of concentration rights and the effect of 
transport costs on the market equilibrium 
NAR supply 
NAR demand 
Qm 
Pm 
PD 
PS 
QT 
NAR demand’ 
then with increasing manure transport, the expensive manure types are considered. 
Higher transport costs lead to a larger downward shift of the demand curve. 
The costs for the buyer of the NARs are the sum of the price to be paid for the right plus 
the transport costs. The cost of obtaining the concentration right is PS*QT. The costs of 
reallocation of the emission is not equal to (PD-PS) * QT because our calculation uses the 
marginal transport cost as the transport cost for each right. The marginal transport cost is 
generally higher if the reallocation costs are not homogeneous for all the emission. 
Graphically, only the shaded part in Figure 2 is the actual reallocation cost and not the 
full area a, b, Ps, Pd.  
 
 
3.4 Data 
For our simulations, we used data from the Flemish Land Agency (Vlaamse 
Landmaatschappij, VLM) for 2006, which is a public body controlling manure exchange 
between farmers. The dataset contains the total farm population and offers data about the 
crops, manure production, NARs and the manure allocation behaviour for each Flemish 
farm. In total 38,777 farms are included in the model. These farms have a total acreage of 
677,000 hectares of farmland. 26,555 farms holding animals is resulting in a total 
nitrogen production of 128 million kg and a phosphate production of 57 million kg. More 
than half of the nitrogen is produced by cattle and more than one third by pigs. Poultry is 
the third most important nitrogen producer (almost 10% of total nitrogen production). 
One fourth of the Flemish farms are surplus farms, i.e. they produce more manure than 
they can spread on their own land (with respect to NARs).  
4 Results 
4.1 Comparing  CPT and EPT  
The NAR system, as an example of a CPT policy, is compared with a simpler tradable 
emission permit (EPT) system. In the CTP system, the firm’s emissions are spatially 
limited by the imposed maximum of concentration rights. The simpler system of tradable 
permits gives the firms more degrees of freedom because they can emit the same amount 
Figure 2: transportation costs in the manure market 
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QT 
a 
b 
of emissions without fully facing the problem of concentrated emission. In fact, firms are 
facing limits at considerably higher concentration levels. In the manure case, the amount 
of manure per ha will then be determined by the agronomical maximum, beyond which 
production, or utility, would be reduced. For the sake of our simulations, this 
agronomical maximum is set at 500 kg N on grassland, 400 kg N/ha on most other crops 
and 200 kg N /ha for the crops accepting only a limited amount of nitrogen such as 
onions, peas and beans. 
The net costs for all manure emission in Flanders, with the EPT system, is estimated to be 
106 million euro (on annual basis). The more complex EPT system results in a higher net 
cost of 118 million euro for all manure emission. The difference of 12 million euro can 
be seen as a consequence of the reallocation costs of the emission in the case of the 
concentration rights (NARs). These results confirm the statement of Stavins (1995) that 
the control of the emission closer to the source with concentration rights might increase 
the transaction costs. The estimate of the transaction costs in our case is still a lower limit 
because we have only taken the transport costs as proxies for transaction costs into 
account and not the costs for information, negotiation or control. Also the public control 
costs are not considered. This manure emission is controlled by soil samples and 
sometimes even by helicopter. The emission reallocation by long distance transport is 
controlled by GPS. This cost of the GPS markers is imposed on the private firms and is 
included in the 12 million euro. The cost of control by helicopter is public and is not 
included.  
A larger difference between both systems can be found in the total costs, i.e. when the 
benefits from trading are not taken into account. The total costs under EPT were almost 
equal to the net costs (106 million euro), because almost no permit trading occurred. 
Under CTP the total costs increase to 180 million euro, meaning that the trade of rights 
leads to an extra cost of 62 million euro.  
Making distinction between suppliers of NARs (i.e. farms producing less nitrogen than 
their available NARs) and demanders of NARs (i.e. farms producing more nitrogen than 
the available NARs) we see that the increment in total costs is mainly at the expense of 
the demanders of NARs (from 79 to 140 million euro or + 82%). The suppliers 
experience an augmentation in total costs of almost 40% ( from 27 to 37 million euro).    
The environmental consequences of the CPT system and the simpler EPT system is also 
quite different. The CPT system imposes a limit to manure emission to prevent that 
excessive nitrogen leaching would occur. The FLA administrative database shows that 
the CPT type of policy has successfully induced a reallocation of the manure emission. 
Figure 3 gives the average municipal nitrogen use per hectare of farmland under a EPT 
system.  
 
Figure 3: average nitrogen use per hectare of land per municipality under EPT in 2006 (kg N/ha) 
The CPT system prevent concentration of emission and forces the firms to reallocate the 
emissions (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: average nitrogen use per hectare of land per municipality under CTP in 2006 (kg N/ha) 
The simulation of our MAS model shows that, from the 677,000 ha, 502,000 ha (74.2%) 
would receive a lower or equal manure emission while 175,000 ha (25.8%) would receive 
a higher manure emission. On 83,000 ha (12.3%) the maximum EU nitrogen 
concentration for vulnerable areas (170 kg N from manure / ha) is exceeded more than 
twice (more than 340 kg N from manure). The environmental comparison of the tradable 
concentration right system and the tradable emission right system for the Flemish manure 
policy thus also confirms that from an environmental perspective a control closer to the 
source is preferable.  
4.2 Market description 
Under an EPT system, farmers are only bounded in their nutrient use because of 
agronomical limits. Simulation results show that under EPT practically all manure could 
be spread on own land. A CPT system leads to a distinction between farmers within the 
sector. One part of the sector has an emission which exceeds their NAR, while for the 
other part of the farmers NAR’s are (partly) left unused. Both exceeders and under-users 
of CPTs can benefit from interaction between them, and thus start trading permits. 
Simulation results (Table II) show that permits indeed are traded between individual 
farmers.  
Table II: simulated manure allocation behaviour under CTP (million kg N), 2006 
 On-land 
disposal 
Own-land 
disposal 
transport Processing Production 
Cattle 67.69 59.62 8.07 0.00 67.69 
Legend
gemeenten
ruimte_081010.ha_etp
< 170 
170 - 250
250 - 340
> 340
Legend
gemeenten
ruimte_081010.ha_ctp
< 170 
170 - 250
250 - 340
> 340
Legend
gem enten
ruimte_081010.ha_c p
< 170 
170 - 250
250 - 340
> 340
Legend
gemeenten
ruimte_081010.ha_ctp
< 170 
170 - 250
250 - 340
> 340
Pig 32.81 12.07 20.74 12.85 45.66 
Poultry 1.03 0.03 1.00 11.68 12.71 
Other 
animals 
2.44 1.85 0.59 0.00 2.44 
Total 103.97 73.57 30.40 24.53 128.50 
 
In 2006, almost 104 million NARs were used in Flanders. This allows to dispose more 
than 80% of the total produced emissions (128 million kg N). From this total nitrogen use 
of 104 million kg, almost 30% is spread on traded NARs. The NAR market is thus 
frequently used by the farmers and is an important tool for the farmer to manage manure 
emission conform the legal prescriptions. However, the supply of NARs is not enough to 
use all manure on land. Therefore still 24 million kg N had to be transported or exported 
to other countries. 
The results show a clear distinction in allocation behaviour for the four types of manure 
which is the result of the heterogeneous nitrogen content in manure. A higher nitrogen 
content results in lower allocation costs per unit of nitrogen. The highest concentrated 
manure type will be chosen for the most expensive allocation option. This explains why 
poultry and pork manure are the preferable manure types to process. Another implication 
of the difference between types of manure is that the traded NARs are mostly used for the 
disposition of pig manure (72% of the totally traded concentration rights). Cattle manure 
is mostly used under own NARs because of the higher reallocation costs in case of NARs 
exchange (12% of the total production) and the fact that cattle farmers usually do possess 
more land per livestock unit than pig or poultry farmers. 
Most of the Flemish farms are involved in the manure market, from specialist arable 
farms, over mixed farms to specialist livestock farms. In the remainder of the paper we 
make a distinction between four types of farmers: big livestock farms (with a manure 
production with an equivalent of phosphate of more than 10.000 kg), intermediate 
livestock farms (5000 – 10000 kg P2O5), small livestock farms (300 – 5000 kg P2O5) and 
non-livestock farms (<300 kg P2O5). This subdivision is based on manure production. 
Within each group, there can be suppliers and demanders of NARs. 
4.3 Market intervention in a tradable concentration permit system 
The high emission treatment cost and reallocation costs resulting from the NAR system, 
caused many actors to oppose to the manure policy. Increasing political pressure incited 
policy makers to develop a number of accompanying measures trying to reduce the 
burden for many small family-based businesses. One of these accompanying measures is 
the manure processing obligation for large firms. The objective of this subsection is to 
analyse this introduction of the manure processing obligation and the distributional 
effects of the market intervention in the market of tradable concentration rights.  
Net effects of the introduction of obligatory manure processing 
The obligatory manure processing regulation forces some firms, mainly the larger ones, 
to process more than half of the amount that has to be processed (13 million kg N). The 
remainder of the emission treatment remains driven by market impulses. We call it 
therefore market-driven processing. The processing obligation imposes farms, with a 
production higher than 10,000 kg phosphate or 7,500 kg phosphate in municipalities with 
high manure concentration, to process a part of their manure surplus. Table III shows the 
aggregated manure allocation behaviour of the Flemish farmers confronted with the 
processing obligation. 
Simulation results show that under processing obligation other manure types have to be 
processed as well. This results from the reduction in degrees of freedom of the farmer. 
The differences in manure allocation behaviour (as well as in the scenario without 
processing obligation (NPMO) as well as in the scenario with processing obligation 
(WPMO)) have led to differences in the costs and benefits structure of individual farms 
and the farm sector as a whole.  
 
 
Table III: simulated manure allocation behaviour under scenarios with obligatory manure processing (million kg N), 2006 
 On-land 
disposal 
Own-land 
disposal 
transport Processing Production 
Cattle 67.16 59.58 7.58 0.53 67.69 
Pig 32.11 11.94 20.17 13.55 45.66 
Poultry 2.27 0.08 2.19 10.80 12.71 
Other 
animals 
2.43 
1.84 
0.59 0.01 
2.44 
Total 103.97 73.44 30.53 24.49 128.46 
 
The aggregated costs and benefits related to manure allocation are given in table IV. 
Table IV: money flows related to the manure allocation under both scenarios, 2006 
 Net costs NAR costs Total costs  
 Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg N) 
Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/NAR) 
Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg N) 
NPMO
(1)
 117.68 0.92 62.61 2.06 180.29 1.40 
WPMO
(2)
 120.57 0.94 56.20 1.84 176.77 1.38 
difference (%) 2.46 2.46 -10.25 -10.65 -1.95 -1.95 
(1) NPMO: scenario with no processing obligation 
(2) WPMO: scenario with processing obligation 
The introduction of the manure processing obligation has led to various effects. On the 
one side, the manure processing obligation increases the net costs by almost 2.5%. In 
other words, the farm sector faces a rise of the net costs of almost 2.5% for allocating the 
manure emission, resulting in a net outflow of cash from the agricultural sector.  
Another important implication of the manure processing obligation is the strong decline 
in the prices of NARs of more than 10%. The result of the rise in allocation costs and the 
decline in NAR prices can be found in the total costs which decrease with almost 2%. 
This means that at aggregated level the livestock farms benefit from the introduction. On 
the other hand, the farms with an excess of NARs  (e.g. firms with land but without 
manure production: arable farms) face an important decline in revenues from selling 
concentration rights. These differences in effects between individual farms are analysed 
into detail in the next section.  
Distributional effects of the introduction of obligatory manure processing 
The initial aim of the manure processing obligation was to protect the small family 
livestock farms from the increased costs from the system of tradable concentration rights. 
Table V summarizes the impact of the policy on different firm sizes.  
 
Table V: Percentages of the manure surplus falling under manure processing obligation 
Percentage of manure surplus per farm size  N under processing obligation 
7,500 ≤ 
P2O5 
<10,000 
10,000≤ 
P2O5 
<12,500 
12,500≤ 
P2O5 
<15,000 
15,000≤ 
P2O5 
 (million kg N) % against 
total N 
surplus 
0 0 0 0  0 0.00 
7.5 12.5 18.75 22.5  3.14 12.80 
15 25 37.5 45  6.29 25.63 
22.5 37.5 56.25 67.5  9.44 38.47 
30 50 75 90  12.59 (current) 51.30 
37.5 62.5 93.75 100  14.82 60.39 
45 75 100 100  16.07 65.48 
75 90 100 100  19.29 78,61 
90 100 100 100  20.99 85,53 
100 100 100 100  21.88 89,16 
 
The results of table 4 show that the processing obligation affects the different groups in a 
totally different way. The non-livestock farms experience a decline of the average total 
costs per farm (-3 %) but at the same time their average net costs per farm increase 
(+12.5%). This is the result of the decline in NAR market prices, which leads to less 
benefits for these farmers. On the other hand, big livestock farms experience a serious 
increase in total costs because of the manure processing obligation. The average total 
costs per produced kilogram nitrogen increase with 8% and the average total costs per 
farm even with 9.5%. The net costs per kg N and per farm increase as well with 8.2 and 
9.6%, respectively. The largest benefits can be found in the class of small livestock 
farms. The total costs per kg produced N decrease with 4.4% for the very small livestock 
farms and 3.2% for the intermediate livestock farms. The change in net costs is less 
pronounced, but still decreasing (-1.4% for  small livestock farms and -3% for 
intermediate livestock farms). These farms face a decline in total costs as well as in net 
costs. The effect in net costs is less distinct because also the benefits generated by selling 
NARs is taken into account and these benefits would decrease because of the processing 
obligation. 
4.4 Efficiency and effectiveness of the introduction of obligatory 
manure processing 
The distinction between total and net costs is important in the determination of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the policy adaptation. Effectiveness can de defined as to 
what extent the desired effect is reached while efficiency indicates whether this is done in 
the most economic way. Mentzer & Konrad (1991) define efficiency as the invert of the 
ratio between the normal level of inputs and the actual level of inputs. Effectiveness can 
be measured as the real set of outputs and the desired set of outputs (Van der Meulen and 
Spijkerman, 1985). 
Translated to the manure problem, the real level of inputs is the net cost for the entire 
farm sector. Efficiency can be calculated by following equation (10): 
    (10) 
The initial policy goal was to decrease the costs for the small livestock farms. The 
effectiveness of the policy can be seen as the extent to which these small livestock farms 
experience a cost reduction and is given by equation (11): 
   (11) 
The current policy has an efficiency score of 97.54% and an effectiveness of 4.11%. To 
achieve an average cost reduction of 4.11% for small livestock farms, the total allocation 
costs of the sector had to lose almost 2.50% in cost efficiency. Both figures depend 
strongly on the initial rules for obliged processing. Therefore, not only the absolute value 
of both parameters is important but also the sensitivity of both parameters to changing 
levels of obliged processing. To asses this effect the percentages of the manure surplus 
that falls under obligatory manure processing per group of farms is experimentally 
changed for ten simulation runs (Table 6). In 2006 24.54 million kg N was in surplus, 
meaning this amount of nitrogen had to be processed. Under the current regulation 12.59 
million kg N must be processed under obligatory processing. By changing the 
percentages of the manure surplus that has to be processed, the total amount of nitrogen 
that has to be processed changes (table VI). 
Table VI: Aggregated results per farm size class, 2006 
  Non-
livestock 
farms 
Small 
livestock 
farms 
Intermediate 
livestock 
farms 
Big livestock 
farms 
Number of farms 18781 17020 2543 433 
Net cost NPMO (€/farm) -1258 3365 24518 50059 
Net cost WPMO (€/farm) -1096 3319 23954 54860 
Total cost NPMO (€/farm) 394 5037 25504 51502 
Total cost WPMO (€/farm) 382 4817 24870 56277 
Net cost NPMO (€/kg N) -6.80 0.5245 1.69 1.80 
Net cost WPMO (€/kg N) -6.07 0.52 1.64 1.94 
Total cost NPMO (€/kg N) 2.50 1.07 1.76 1.85 
Total cost WPMO (€/kg N) 2.39 1.02 1.70 2.00 
 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are given in figure 5 where the efficiency and 
effectiveness are given per percentage of surplus manure that falls under obligatory 
manure processing.  
The higher the percentage of the aggregated manure surplus that falls under the 
obligatory manure processing policy, the more effective the policy will be. A higher 
percentage under processing obligation, means that large farms are required to process 
more, and more NARs become available for small farms. Moreover, because of the 
declining demand for NARs, NAR-prices will decrease which again lowers the costs. The 
drawback of this, is the decreasing efficiency. The rise in effectiveness of the social 
correction is coupled with a decline in total costs efficiency. Since more and more 
allocation choices are determined by government policies, the market situation departs 
more and more from the most efficient allocation. If 90% of the aggregated manure 
surplus would fall under the processing obligation, the total costs for small farms would 
decrease with almost 12%. The cost the sector has to pay for this, is an increase of the net 
costs with almost 6%. 
 
Figure 5: Efficiency and effectiveness under different degrees of manure processing obligations 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Montgomery (1972) has already shown theoretically that a competitive market of a 
tradable concentration rights system ensures the minimization of total emission control 
costs subject to the constraint of attaining the predetermined environmental standard at 
each receptor. Stavins (Stavins, 1995) refined the statement by considering the fact that 
transaction costs shift the market equilibrium also in the case of emission permits. Stavins 
(Stavins, 1995) suggested that transaction costs impede the implementation of tradable 
concentration permit systems despite the theoretical advantages in pollution control.  
The research described in this paper use the well-known manure problem as an analogue 
to these tradable concentration permits and allows to describes transportation costs in the 
pricing. The case is token from the Flemish manure policy. The paper uses a multi agent 
simulation model on the administrative database of 36,000 firms active in the trade of 
manure concentration rights to simulate the cost and the effectiveness of emission policy 
alternatives. The model is a combination of mathematical programming models 
simulating the least cost disposition of the emissions of individual firms and a spatial 
equilibrium model to simulate the spatial price formation of the concentration rights. The 
reallocation costs of the emissions are also simulated as an important part of the 
transaction costs that the firms face in the context of tradable concentration rights.  
The simulations show that the CPT system outperforms the traditional tradable emission 
permit system in terms of reaching maximum environmental standards in the different 
locations in Flanders. This environmentally better performance comes at an emission 
reallocation cost for the emission producing firms. In Flemish manure case this accounts 
for 56 million euro which is about 5,828 Euro per firm with excess emissions. The 
conclusion is that a tradable concentration permits system is an adequate policy 
alternative for a case with following features: a low reallocation cost of the emission, a 
transparent distribution of the concentration rights and a market for concentration rights 
with many participants.  
In the case of manure, the emission is transportable to the location of the concentration 
rights. This gives the opportunity to more firms to participate in the market for the 
concentration rights resulting in a more competitive market. The regional submarkets 
face different prices but they are still linked by the emission reallocation costs. These 
findings allows for generalisation to concentration permit trading. The reallocation cost 
of the emission is an important reason why the system is not often used as a pollution 
control option. In the case of air or water toxins, where reallocation costs are very high, 
this means that rights can only be transferred to firms within a certain area and several 
small markets would exist (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987).  
The distribution of the concentration rights in the Flemish manure case is based on the 
usage of agricultural land. A number of concentration rights is assigned to each plot 
based on its size, its location and vulnerability to nitrate leaching. The cost of 
administration of these concentration rights is currently limited, because the agricultural 
land area per farmer has to be  administered anyway for the common agricultural policy 
direct payments. The main extra cost is the administration of the exchange of NARs 
between firms. 
An important topic for controversy are the different possibilities of transferability of the 
concentration rights (Tietenberg, 2003). Those who are in favour of free exchange of the 
permits argue that any restriction reduces the efficiency of the system (Tietenberg, 2003). 
Yet, others argue that intervention in the free market of rights is justifiable to prevent 
socially unacceptable outcomes such as destruction of community interest, degradation of 
the environment and concentration of rights. The last argument was the motivation of the 
Flemish government to intervene in the system of tradable concentration rights of 
manure. The policy has introduced an obligation to the largest firms to process a part of 
their emission to prevent them from dominating the concentration right market. Our 
analysis of the policy intervention confirms what has already been revealed in other 
studies: intervention increases overall emission abatement costs (Tietenberg, 2003; Van 
der Straeten et al., 2009a).  
The more the government intervenes, the higher the loss in efficiency is. Our model 
results also confirm that imposing obligatory manure processing on the larger farms 
protects the small family livestock farms against the competition for concentration rights 
from the large firms. Results show that the obligation to process has indeed a positive 
effect on the total costs of the small family livestock farms. A stronger intervention leads 
to a higher effectiveness of this policy be it at a certain overall cost for the sector. It is the 
task of policy makers to make a trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness. The 
stronger the intervention, the more the costs to meet the prescriptions are passed on from 
the small family livestock farms to the large livestock farms. 
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